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Introduction
We estimate non-linear fiscal reaction functions (FRF) for four Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain; the GIPS), by introducing adjustment thresholds conditional not only on the size of debt but also on the state of the economy and a measure of financial pressure, thereby providing a more accurate description of the behaviour of fiscal policy authorities.
Common features of the GIPS include bail-outs from the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission. This justifies the recent concerns and offers a useful ground for sustainability testing. 
The GIPS' Fiscal Reaction Function
The model-based FRF approach to fiscal sustainability testing requires the estimation of:
PRIMSURPL a DEBT
where PRIMSURPL t is the ratio of primary surplus to GDP and DEBT t is the ratio of debt to GDP. A sufficient condition for sustainability is ρ>0, implying that governments undertake corrective actions to counteract changes in debt (see, e.g. Bohn, 1998) .
A linear FRF such as (1), nevertheless, implicitly assumes that corrective action is invariant with the size of debt, whilst theoretical political economy models suggest a non-linear adjustment, due to the difficulties in reaching the necessary consensus to fiscal consolidation (see, e.g. Bertola and Drazen, 1993 
Empirical estimation of the GIPS' non-linear FRF: the main results
We use, for each country, the longest available annual time series data from the annual macroeconomic database ( Bohn, 2007) . Using this approach makes little difference to our estimates.
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Least Squares estimates of the short-run models are reported in Tables 1-4 (rather than assuming strict exogeneity of cycle t and finpressure t , we have also employed 2-Stage Least Squares using an intercept, CV t-1 , ΔDEBT t-1 , and three lags of both cycle t , and finpressure t as instruments; this made no qualitative difference to the results reported here). All GIPS adjust budgetary disequilibria only in the higher debt regime, and the debt threshold for adjustment is estimated at 69% for Greece, 49% for Ireland, 47% for Portugal and 43% for Spain.
With respect to the state-varying component, for all GIPS the 1 DEBT τ estimates are negative and GDP (based on Purchasing Power Parity). As alternative measures of financial market pressure, we used the (i) spread between the 10-year yield on the GIPS and the 10-year yield on German bonds, and (ii) a 2(and 3)-year moving standard deviation of the spread but failed to find any significant effect. We also find a statistically significant growth threshold close to 3% for all GIPS, whilst the output gap resulted statistically insignificant (results on request), signalling that GIPS fiscal authorities might be more concerned with output growth rather than output relative to potential (see e.g. Fatas and Mihov (2008) ). For all GIPS, both the cycle impact and fiscal adjustment become stronger when the economy is slowing down (the cycle impact is insignificant for Greece). This suggests some degree of fiscal imprudence from the GIPS's end; instead of prioritising fiscally responsible actions during good times, their corrective action is stronger when growth weakens. For all countries, model (2)- (4) with the state-varying threshold provides the best fit (in terms of a lower regression standard error). The bottom line of each Table reports the Chow forecast test for structural stability due to the recent economic/financial crisis (we test for a break when the crisis erupted in 2007). The test highlights the superiority of the non-linear over the linear models; the former do not fail structural stability but the latter do.
Conclusions
We have introduced non-linear FRF with state-varying thresholds to describe the behaviour of the GIPS fiscal policy authorities. Whilst linear models would support the sustainability of the GIPS fiscal policy, our approach documents some relevant shortcomings, justifying current market concerns. Greece fiscal position within this model stands out as its threshold is higher than the 60% reference value of the Maastricht Treaty, its fiscal adjustment is much slower and the primary surplus does not respond to the economic cycle. Further, under pressure from financial markets, all countries lower the debt ceiling above which corrective action is taken.
Hence, pressure by financial markets appears to be more effective than the formal excessive deficit procedure (EDP) in making member states correct fiscal imbalances. FINANC IAL PRESSURE VARIABLE
